Following the end of World War II, the Great Britain found that she was no longer capable of retaining control over all of her colonies. The war left the British overstretched both monetarily and physically, hastening the independence of several developing states, including India and Nigeria. The former declared independence in 1947[1] following a long “fight,” in which revolutionaries used Henry David Thoreau’s teachings on civil disobedience (largely propagated by Mohandas K. Gandhi[2]) to disrupt British administration. Nigeria, on the other hand, became independent on October 1, 1960[3], following much British planning for the transfer of power from colonial authorities to the native elites. However, these nations share far more than a former colonizer and status as a developing nation.
Both India and Nigeria are nations, which encompass people from over 200 ethno-linguistic groups (speaking “mutually unintelligible languages”[4]). Furthermore, in both countries, the diversity of religion exacerbates problems inherent in such a heterogeneous nation. Nigeria and India have tried to mitigate these issues with the institution of federalism, continuing creation of states to dissolve power, and patronage politics. Perhaps most disappointingly, both Nigeria and India have had consistent problems with distribution of wealth, evident in the gap between their overall GDP ranking and that of their per-capita GDP[5]. Yet with these and far more similarities between Nigeria and India, their political evolution has been markedly different. Therefore, the relative political saliency of the Indian government compared with the instability evident in Nigerian political history begs the question: What caused these nations’ political institutions to evolve along such different lines? More specifically, what has prevented Nigeria from preserving stable, respected democratic institutions and is there a model for development that can aid this process (such as that of East Asia)?
In attempting to appropriately analyze this question, one must take into account several factors, which differentiate Nigeria from India and have led to divergent stories. One major difference between India and Nigeria lies in their pre-colonial history. India had “a centuries-old civilization that had evolved and spread through most of the Indian subcontinent well before the establishment of British colonial rule”[6], whereas Nigeria was a collection of separate ethnic groups, each with a different form of government, history, and culture. Secondly, in India the cleavages between different ethnic and religious groups are cross-cutting[7], meaning that all of the ethnic groups are forced to interact and at times unite in order to achieve mutual goals. On the other hand, the cleavages in Nigerian society remain overlapping, meaning that each group is geographically separated and competes for allocation of resources and access to power. Finally, India and Nigeria went about federalism in slightly different ways, with the latter developing a pluralistic state and the former taking up a dominant-party system[8]. The sum of these differences explains the divergent levels of success in preserving democratic institutions in India and Nigeria. Furthermore, these issues, among others, display why the East Asian developmental model could not be applied to Nigeria as of yet.
Prior to the entrenchment of the Nigerian status quo, the region now known as Nigeria existed as a markedly different entity. In the North, (mostly made up of the Fulani and Hausa ethnic groups) the leadership was comprised of emirs and palace officials. In the Southwestern region there existed a two historical kingdoms (both Yoruba): the Ile-Ife and the Oyo kingdoms. Both administered leadership through a centralized monarchy.[9] In the Southeast, leadership was administered through what Okechukwu Iheduru called “decentralized segmented political systems” with all-male and all-female village assemblies. Outside of these major ethnic groups, smaller ethnicities had their own forms of government as well. However, the arbitrary borders created at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), which brought together the region of “Nigeria” (formally combined in the amalgamation of 1914) suddenly forced groups of people with different languages, government, and histories together and politicized their identities[10]. When the British eventually handed over power in 1960, they left behind a people without a cohesive political history and with no ties to one another.
Therefore, the Western style government established after independence and those within it continue to hold little legitimacy in Nigeria. Joel Migdal aptly described this case by noting “the ineffectiveness of state leaders who have faced impenetrable barriers to state predominance has stemmed from the nature of the societies they have confronted—from the resistance posed by chiefs, landlords…(for convenience ‘strongmen’) through their various organizations.”[11] In order to maintain power and assuage the concerns of these “strongmen” Nigeria has used two methods: the first being the proliferation of patronage politics and the second being allowing some groups to exercise autonomy over the law in their land. For example, the Nigerian government has allowed for Sharia law to be instituted in predominantly Muslim regions, which in turn leads to different patterns of development in the North and South. Also, the resultant politics has led to a widely corrupt government, in which all branches, from the executive to the judiciary have lost the little legitimacy they held to begin with.
This can easily be contrasted the political legacy left in India, where “in spite of the formation of diverse linguistic communities, from the time of the Indo-Aryan settlement…a common civilization began to take shape in the northern and central plains.”[12] This history meant that most Indians remained comfortable with centralized rule and few questioned the legitimacy of the political systems developed as a whole.[13] This difference proves extremely important when looking at the string of coups, which have disrupted Nigerian democracy, including a pair in January and July of 1966—the first of which was welcomed by the masses who were tired of corruption, the second caused by suspicion that the Igbos were attempting to take control. Meanwhile, India has never seen a coup d’état, implying that even when the Indian people hold grievances with the leader, they do not consider the entire system as flawed. For example, following Sikh dissatisfaction with Indira Gandhi, Gandhi was assassinated, but the government was not disposed. This conclusion works when evaluating the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi as well.
Yet the reason why Nigerians consistently lack confidence in their government is deeper than the difference in their legacies. Nigeria, unlike India, is a nation with overlapping cleavages in every sense of the word. In the North, the majority of the population is either Hausa or Fulani and is predominantly Muslim. In the Southwest, the majority of the population is Yoruba and is both Christian and Muslim[14], whereas in the Southeast, the majority is Igbo and predominantly Christian. Therefore, conflicts between the groups can take on either a religious or ethnic strain. This differs from India in that the dominance of Hinduism in most regions (if not a strong presence in all regions) provides Indians in various regions with a singular identity. On the other hand, because the divisions in Nigeria are so overlapping, small issues can easily balloon into major conflicts, as members of one ethnic group are quick to accuse others of trying to attain a monopoly of power.
This is evidenced by the second coup in 1966, where the Igbo dominated military leadership was overthrown due to the lack of charges brought against Igbo leaders for corruption and the enactment of the Decree no. 34 of 1966, “which unified the federal bureaucracy and police forces…[which] undermined…federalism.”[15] Following the killing of the leader of the first coup (General Ironsi) General Gowon came to power and several pogroms of Igbos in the North took place. The final straw, however, came when the government divided the country into twelve states, three of which came from the former Eastern Region.[16] At that point, the East declared independence and the Biafra war commenced, taking nearly three million lives between 1967 and 1970. Not only does the war display the depth of the overlapping cleavages, but it also explains the continued lack of trust and the constant enmity between the ethnic groups.
While there may be enmity between the ethnic groups (Dravidians, Indo-Aryans, Telegu, Tamil etc.) in India, there has yet to be a large-scale civil war between the groups. As mentioned previously, this is partially because of the existence of Hinduism as a mollifying force. In Kashmir, there has been unrest, as it represents an overlapping cleavage in India, but this has not been enough to disrupt democracy all together. Other notable religious conflicts in recent years occurred in Gujarat, when hordes of Hindus went into largely Muslim areas and killed a number of people following an attack on a train that killed a few Hindus[17]. Yet while this resembles the attacks on the Igbo in the North, one must emphasize the fact that these have yet cause a significant disturbance in India’s political structure. For this reason, “gentlemen’s agreements” are not commonplace in India as in Nigeria. Furthermore, while the agreement—to alternate the leadership of the country between ethnic groups from different regions—is nowhere to be found in Nigeria’s constitution, it has been pivotal in maintaining stability in the country. This differs from India, where the lack of Muslim Prime-Ministers, for example, has never warranted an informal agreement.
In fact, the need to ensure representation in India is not so much focused upon ethnic or religious representation as much as upon representation of all castes. This has led to a system of “reservations,” (similar to the programs for ethnic minorities in Nigeria) for members of lower castes. Yet when the Indian government approved measures like the Mandal Report of 1990, the upper-castes responded not by asking for a new government, but by changing their last names in order to be perceived as a member of a lower caste and “suicide of several upper-caste students.”[18] The approval of the report did help to engender support for the BJP (Bhatriya Janata Party) and their hinduttva agenda, also supporting the idea that the Indian people see the government as a means to achieve their ends, not as an inherent obstacle to them.[19]
Support for India’s government may seem startling to some, since a single party has dominated its political atmosphere (the Congress party with recent challenges by the BJP). However, because of the winner take all system and the need to have a majority to consolidate power in the Parliament, the political parties, including the Congress party, must form alliances in order to maintain power. In many ways this represents a normalizing force in Indian politics, as it forces the parties to broaden their rhetoric in order to maintain power. This differs from the politics of Nigeria, which is pluralistic. Yet, several would expect the result to be the same, as the need for Nigerian politicians (for President) to achieve twenty-five percent of the vote in two-thirds of the states would seemingly force them to broaden their appeal.
Sadly, that has not been the case. Parties in Nigeria usually start along ethnic lines,[20] such as the Action Group (Yoruba) and Northern Elements Progressive Union (minority in North). Furthermore, because ethnic appeals rarely gain widespread support, voter fraud has become a common theme, the most reprehensible case being in the 2003 presidential election Obasanjo and General Buhari. In the election, results in some regions even exceeded the population count. Still, the judiciary upheld the elections, determining that Obasanjo would have won with or without the fraud; further undermining support for the government.[21]
The lack of legitimacy held by Nigeria’s government leaves several wondering what could be a viable solution for the country. While some propose the East-Asian model of development, such solutions ignore the drastic differences in the composition, administration, and culture on the ground. For example, Clifford Geertz recognized that a nation of communalism is a key challenge to nation building. Furthermore, he pointed out that the existence of primordial identities undermines allegiance to the state.[22]Both are extremely strong in Nigeria and already inhibit the Nigerian government’s ability to sustain development. The conditions needed for nation building are further expanded upon by Chalmers Johnson, who points out that Japan’s remarkable development seems “unattainable under true political pluralism.”[23] Nigeria’s government, on the other hand, is by constitutional definition, pluralistic and, therefore, not suitable to that type of development. Johnson also includes a stable political bureaucratic elite, balance between public and private sectors, heavy investment in primary and secondary education, and reasonable government utilization of price mechanisms. However, the government of Nigeria lacks stability (constant charges of corruption, several coups, and underhanded attempts to change the constitution[24]), has consistently shed jobs from the public sector (which were often attained through patronage), and has devalued the naira to embarrassingly low levels without contemplating the domestic consequences.[25]
Therefore, while the East Asian model remains admirable in its speed and effectiveness, Nigeria must undergo serious, substantive reform before it can even consider following in the footsteps of Eastern Asia. This reform includes the end to ethno-centric politics, a consistent and far-reaching effort to eliminate corruption, and efforts to legitimize the government. These measures would not only aid Nigeria in its developmental goals, but also aid Nigeria in attaining the political stability of its Indian peers, while providing relief to the millions suffering from the rampant misdevelopment within.
Works Cited
Geertz, Clifford. "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States." The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York, NY: Basic, 2008. Print.
Iheduru, Okechukwu, “Nigeria,” in J. Kopstein and M. Lichbach, eds. Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities and Institutions in a Changing Global Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 535-587
Johnson, Chalmers, “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan,” in F.C. Deyo ed. The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 136-164
Johnson, Samuel, and O. Johnson. The History of the Yorubas from the Earliest times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010. 70. Print.
Migdal, Joel, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton University Press, 1988) pp. 3-15, 33-41.
Mustafa, Seema. "Gujarat Riots: Narendra Modis Role Is the Larger Issue - Analysis - DNA." DNA: Daily News & Analysis. 11 Nov. 2011. Web. 26 Nov. 2011. <http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/comment_gujarat-riots-narendra-modis-role-is-the-larger-issue_1610749>.
Sil, Rudra, “India,” in J. Kopstein and M. Lichbach, eds. Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities and Institutions in a Changing Global Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 367-417.
[2] It is worth noting that the need for the British to coopt local elites and educate them to run the colony provided the foundation for future calls for independence. For example, Gandhi attended law school in Britain, where he was most likely introduced to the teachings such as those of Thoreau. (See Sil pp376, 377)
[4] Above (—) p542
[5] India GDP-ppp= 4th highest, per capita GDP 130s; Nigeria GDP-ppp= 44th, per capita GDP 141 (Sil Lecture on India and Nigeria, respectively)
[7] A notable exception to this is Kashmir in India. Also, the Indians largely took care of their overlapping cleavage problem with the partition of the former colony into India and (eventually) Pakistan and Bangladesh.
[8] See Note 4 and Sil p381 respectively
[9] It may be worth noting that in the Ọyo kingdom, the role of “Oba” or “king” was “not necessarily hereditary.” See (Samuel) Johnson p70
[13] One must point out, however, that the British did attempt to “divide and rule” the Indians, as represented by the 1905 Bengal partition and the use of high caste Indians in key administrative posts. (Sil, Lecture on India) However, their history prior to British colonialism made the consolidation of power much easier.
[17] See Mustafa Daily News Analysis
[19] —
[20]The only notable exception being that of the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC)
See Iheduru p539
[24] Refers to former President Obasanjo’s attempt to sneak an amendment allowing him to run for a third term. See Iheduru p572
[25] —
